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RE 
BUL 
TIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM IN 
MANN'S DEMYTHOLOGISING 
HERMENEUTIC 
by PROFESSOR JOSEPH R UNZO 
the reliability of the kerygmatic tradition must not be 
questioned, for otherwise the eschatological event to which 
the kerygma testifies would be implicated in the relativity 
of all historical knowledge.1 
EVEN as RudolfBultmann's demythologising hermeneutic has irresistibly revolutionised biblical criticism, it has remained 
an uneasy alliance between historical criticism and philosophi-
cal insight, and an uneasy duality between the exigencies of 
historical relativism and the claims of the kerygma. An initial 
examination of Bultmann's demythologising program will 
expose a remarkable tension between the relativism of his 
philosophy of history and the absolutism of his Christian 
existentialism. I will then assess several prima facie contra-
dictions which arise within Bultmann's thought from this 
relativist-absolutist tension. I will conclude with a suggested 
resolution of this tension between historical relativism and the 
absolutist claims within Bultmann's theology. For only by 
clarifying and dealing forthrightly with the serious conflicts 
within the demythologising hermeneutic can we retain the 
spirit of Bultmann's own admonition that in approaching the 
mythological elements of the biblical world-view, 'absolute 
clarity and ruthless honesty are essential both for the academic 
theologian and for the parish priest'. 2 
I 
Bultmann's demythologising hermeneutic evolved from his 
pastoral concerns. 'The real problem', he says in reply to Karl 
Jaspers' critique of demythologisation, 'is the problem of inter-
preting the Bible and the teachings of the Church in such a way 
1 Rudolf Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Rudolf 
Bultmann et al., Kerygma and M_yth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch 
(New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, rg6r), p. I r6. 
2 RudolfBultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, p. g. 
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tFhat ,they
11
may become understandable as a 
or at a costs the preacher must not 
dark about what he secretly eliminate" 
d k b · h' 1 ' ~, nor 
ar .a out It . 1~se f .2 And despite the 
locutiOn of ehmination-'dem · 
meneutic, motivated by this pastoral r>r..-.-. ... ,~-­
construction: 'Its aim is not to eliminate 
statements [from t~: Bible] but to interpret 
The demythologising hermeneutic was 
pastoral concern as Bultmann, looking back 
conf~o?ted t~e acute 'problem of history' :4 
relativity, rmsed by the historicity of human 
compounded by the strictures which histori 
ology places on any interpretation of the Bi 
document.5 Let us define a 'world-view' as 
schema of all the cognitive elements which 
experience-viz. primarily concepts and 
interrelationships, the syntax and semantics 
logic. Bultmann holds that each person li 
lives within the world-view(s) of his or'her 
historian investigates the historical biblical 
perception of them is delimited by the co11ce:ot112 
his world-view. 6 Yet the historian is 
which were created within the conceptual 
different world-view. For the cosmology of 
Bultmann says, is mythological (essentially b 
of Jewish apocalyptic and the Gnostic rec:len1ntion 
the modern person is a technological ....,.,.,,.ct..-.·n. 
scientific world-view. Hence, if the modern p 
to take seriously the question of God, he 
1 Rudolf Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization' 
Rudolf Bultmann, M_yth and Christianity: An Inquiry into 
without Myth, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: N 
2 Rudolf Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', 
p. g. 
3 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New Y 
Sons, 1958), p. 18. cf. Bultmann, 'The Case for Demvtho,lm!"Iz; 
Christianity, p. 59· 
4 See Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization'~ in 
5 See Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of thf!? .New 7i 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), val. 2, 
6 See, for example, Rudolf Bultmarrq, Jesus and the 
Smith and Erminie Huntress Lantero (New York: Charles 
p. 3· 
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'th the mythological element in Christianity' .1 And 
w~ · toricity of both human experience and the Bible 
ISdemythologisation of the Bible-a process which 
a was begun within the New Testament itself, 
and then more radically by John. 2 Precisely what 
though, as Bultman~ pro~os~s in his famous essa,r, 
ent and Mythology, to stnp the kerygma of Its 
.j.;,.,,n1,P'Uilnl:·~>' jn order to 'demythologise it'? 
is incautiously ambiguous in his use of 'demytho-
He uses the locutions 'mythology' and, consequently, 
· · in two different ways. Sometimes he defines 
in terms of an imagistic way of using language, and 
as the attempt to eliminate that imagistic 
biblical documents in order to make the underlying 
meaning of those texts evident. In this usage, 
says that 'mythology is the use of imagery to express 
Idly in terms of this world and the divine in terms 
life', a and he refers to mythological language as 
'. 4 Besides this imagistic sense of 'mythology', 
also uses what we can refer to as the 'scientific sense' 
In this sense, 'mythological thought regards the 
, ... as an interference with the course of nature, 
the life of the soul ... -a miracle, in fact'. 5 Bultmann 
can call this conception of the world mythological 
does not believe that the course of nature can 
... by supernatural powers'. 6 
whether 'mythology' is understood in the imagistic 
sense, and whether one concomitantly 'demythol-
Bible by eliminating metaphorical talk about the 
by eliminating unscientific conceptions and explana-
'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth, 
Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 32-4. 
Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, note 2, 
Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
, p. 12, and 'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and 
Christ and LVlythology, p. 21. 
:S.uu:mann, 'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, 
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 15 (cf. p. 38). Bultmann is careful to 
is not simply what later turns out to be false: e.g. old and now 
':iews are not 'myths'. (See Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses 
, m Kerygma and Myth, p. 103.) 
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tions, the reason for employing this neJrment~r 
~orld-view wh.ich the modern person po:sse!;sm: 
JUSt because of his or her place in history · 
the biblical world-view.1 Foundationai IS 
demythologising hermeneutic is his rp,~'r .,. ...... ~;-~-;:.:...~< 
relativity. Demythologising is necessary bot~ because G?d should not be 'objectified' 
ancient world-view as a fixed entity whose 
manent and petrified, 2 and because humans as 
possessing the world-view(s) of their own ~ge 
confront God by attempting to use a world- : 
their own. 
II 
We can use 'relativism' in its broadest sense 
epistemological position which holds or entails tha 
ness or incorrectness ofJudgments about matters of 
varies with which individual cogniser, or which 
cognisers such as a particular society or the 
making the judgment. We can then refer to 
which deny this as 'absolutist'. Bultmann nu· nsc~It!S: 
about the meaning of 'relativism', but he essenti 
this definition when he says in History and 
relativism denies 'the absolute value of judgmen 
ledge, and . . . [confirms] the dependence of all 
valuing on their time and culture'. 3 
Although, for reasons which will become 
Bultmann resists the application of the term 
own thought, he is a relativist in his general episte1rn 
more particularly, he is a relativist in his philosoph 
(Actually, since Bultmann holds that humans an~ 
historical beings, the relativism of his 
becomes essentially the relativism of his general 
1 For a discussion of some difficulties not considered here 
Bultmann's ambiguous usage of'myth' see Ronald W ....... .:;;uu~uu. 
and the Problem of Validity', in New Essays in Phitosophic·al 
Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (New York: Ma~cm111an, 
should be noted that Bultmann hofds that certain mytho,logicaJH 
transcendence-can never be dispensed with ('A Reply to 
Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth; pp. 102-3). 
2 Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and 
3 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 78. 
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former thus largely implies the latter as well as the 
the former.) Bultmann says that 'every inter-
with him certain conceptions, ... as presupposi-
his exegesis' .1 And in History and Eschatology, his most 
statement ofhis philosophy of history, Bultmann says 
interpretation of history presupposes a hermeneutic 
and that, because of our 'pre-understanding' of the 
consideration, each interpretation of history is 
by the manner in which questions are put to the 
documents in question. 2 Consequently, Bultmann 
'the subjectivity of the historian is a necessary factor of 
historical knowledge'. 3 
this basic epistemological position that one necessarily 
a subject matter, historical or otherwise, 
s own (historically determined) point of view, 
draws the relativist conclusion that there is no 
historical knowledge in the sense of 'absolute ultimate 
.4 And thus for biblical criticism, the theological 
in the New Testament have meaning for us 
... timeless general truths, but only as the expression 
erstanding of human existence which for the man 
also is a possibility for his understanding of 
value are, then, relative-relative to one's histori-
~teJrm:'me:d world-view. We can summarise and give a 
formalisation of Bultmann's relativist philosophy 
by characterising the logical form which truth and 
i:l~>"-'Lc;ulc;Hts would thus have as follows. On the view 
t5uJltmLan.n expresses here, the form of a truth statement 
, S, is: 
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 48. 
History and Eschatology, pp. I I o, 1 I 3· 
It is thi~ recognition that every interpretation of history involves 
of the mterpreter which provides the philosophical foundation 
pio:nee.l ring .work concerning the necessity of using form and 
to mvestigate the early church's own historical interpretation 
in the biblical texts. 
2!. The beginnings of this position were stated much earlier in Jesus 
p. II). 
Theology of the New Testament, vol. 2, p. 251. 
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And the corresponding logical form of a :s~:a.tetne·nt ,nf-. 
for a sentence, S, would be for Bultmann: 
It is valuable ... on world-view W . .. that 
IfBultmann is consistent in his relativist ep:tst<~mok)2~';." 
every statement of truth and of value will follow 
form of these two logical forms for sentences. 
Thus, Bultmann's general relativist position 
sentential operator with two components for 
sentence. Those two components would be .... ·.r.-..,--_"" 
operator, 'it ~s ~r.ue', or a valuation operator (e.g. 
and the relatiVISing operator, 'on world-view W' isi~g operator' I mean an exclusionary · w~1ch contrasts one set of cognisers, such asy'""04·nL"e'"'','sJ.,~J.£l;Jl. A.c 
~VIth all other. cognisers. The relativity of the 
judgments which the consistent application of 
valuation, and relativising operators entails is a 
relativity of correctness of judgments about matters 
value which constitutes relativism broadly rn,nr~~;-t,.,.e:~; 
With this formalisation of the logic of .&J .......... J. .. J.Cl;i.u.! ~ 
relativist epistemology, we can see why he 
Testament and Mythology' that 'the only criticism 
Testament which is theologically relevant is that 
necessarily out of the situation [particularly the 
modern man'. 2 A person possesses a specific world,.. 
has been shaped principally by the historical forces 
place in history. That world-view delimits the 
and conceptions, arising out of one's -pi·e-1uncterstanctl!l 
which one will approach the biblical texts. 
Now, one might alter portions of one's world-
fronted with sufficiently significant and persis 
which are not satisfactorily accounted for 
world-view. Yet we must always use, and so 
our current world-view in order to assess and ., ...... ,..,. .... "'""' 
elements for that world-view. One cannot, 
world-views in toto the way one trades suits ofclO•tnJes~~, 
1 In order to prevent logical contradi~tions, there will neces~uiJ'~; 
which will be excepted from the strictures of these relativising 
e.g. the law of non-contradiction. 
2 Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and 
3 See ibid., p. 3· 
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to interpret the Bible by demythologising it, so as 
the Bible meaningful to modern people, does not 
a superadded and nonessential item of hermeneutical 
For if one's world-view is formed within, and thus 
by, the modern scientific world-view(s), that very fact 
--'--·~""",·,ne, in part, the epistemic starting-point of historical 
into the Bible. One cannot simply eliminate one's own 
·ew and replace it with some composite of the world-
of the early church. To reject the demythologising 
tic totally is effectually either to deny the relativist 
gy which the historicity of human experience seems 
upon us, or to deny that there is any literal sense in 
of the mythological elements of the Bible. Conversely, to 
a demythologising hermeneutic is, and is no more than, 
·ust to hold that the message of scripture and the church 
to any specific, historically determined world-view; 
say (following Matt. 28. I g) that the kerygma is for 'all 
, whatever their place in history. 
III 
te the relativism of his philosophy of history, Bultmann 
radical relativism. (This is why in History and Escha-
Bultmann rejects the term 'relativism' to describe his own 
)1 Thus in Jesus and the Word Bultmann offers two 
reasons, one of which he later rejected, for saying that 
cal criticism 'does not end in complete relativism, as if 
were a spectacle wholly dependent on the individual 
· t of the observer' .2 First he says that the observer's 
ositions, which are true relative to his world-view, must 
ed, 'that history may actually speak'. But as we have 
,,.B111t1:nann later does reject this view and holds instead that 
niS1tOrtcal investigation always involves the world-view and 
hermeneutic of the historian. Second, however, 
enunciates an absolutist framework which encom-
his general relativist philosophy of history, by making the 
· which he retained, that certain parts of history can 
asped by objective methods. In Jesus and the Word he 
ts, for example, that the correct chronological sequence 
1 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. r 36. 
2 Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, p. 4 (italics mine). 
408 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF 
of historical events can be comprehended 
methods. More importantly, in 'New Testam t 
I , .c: • en o ogy, 10r Instance, he talks about the use ofn"'''"""T•·"-'-
to preserve the truth of the New Testament 
first of these two absolutist claims about history · 
and the second, while central to Bultmann's theol IS 
· · d · h .c: • • ogy1 mamtaine Ill t e lOrm Ill Which Bultmann nri'>C<A1r.~~· 
!h~ chronological order of historical events is not 
objective fact. In the first place, there are no 
simpliciter; there are only historical facts relative to th 
struc~u~e of the world-_view of the inquirer. I am n~t 
t~at I~ Is extremely difficult or impossible to isolate 
h:stor:cal events and their temporal relationships 
~Istoncal ~ocuments are themselves tightly in.,_~><,.i-T ..• , ..... 
InterpretatiOn. Rather, since semantic meaning is 
one's world-view, there are only historical 'facts' qua 
which someone perceives them. Hence, I think 
wrongl_Y su~ges.ts that 'strict methodological 
recognise objectively ... events in so far as they are 
occurrences' .
2 For the character, and hence the 1'c 1en.tlt'Vl\ 
particular historical 'event' is ir: part determined by 
ceptual structure of the world-view of the inquirer. 
matter, the conceptual structure of the inquirer's 
even determines the criteria-e.g. duration, rela 
parts, etc.-for what counts as an 'event'.) As 
example, and one which Bultmann would readily 
only be a historical 'fact' for oneself that Jesus was an: 
if one believes that exorcism is possible. 
Likewise, and in the second place, if we can 
of historical inquiry only in terms of the world-
inquirer, then in some instances a chronological 
historical events may not even be within the ,......, .,..,.,.. ........... ~ 
possible. It can only be a 'fact' that certain 
particular temporal relation to each other if such 
'chronological' are semantically meaningful wi 
ceptual structure of the inquirer's own world-view. 
neither what historical events occurred, nor the order, 
1 ibid., p. 5, and Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', 
M_yth, p. IO. 
2 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. I r6 (italics mine). 
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h. t ·cal events occurred, can be absolute, objective facts. IS on . , h h 
d absolutist aspect In Bultmann s thoug t-t e secon 1 · · f th truth of the New Testament proc amat10n-1s 0 
on ~is constructive aim. of identifying the foundational 
ofthe New Testament and its mythology. Bulti?~nn 
any claim for the. absoluteness, of t~~ C~nstmn 
He argues directly against Tro:Itsch s pos~t~on ~n, say, 
soluteness of Christianity and the Hzstory ohif RelhzgzonCs,h :V~en 
that it is meaningless to hold t at t e nstmn 
hich is a historical phenomenon, is absolute in the 
w essing the 'highest rank' and being of 'irreplaceable 
human culture'. Yet Bultmann subsequently asserts 
uteness of the Christian faith with respect to the 
which it demands of the believer. 2 This absolutist 
tes a contradiction within Bultmann's own thought. 
while recognising historical relativity, Bul~mann m~kes 
· t claim because he wants to avmd a radical ;Ui:J\.n..,..•-~~ 
which he feels would deny the compelling claims of 
. Now certain kinds of absolutist claims are com-
with a relativist epistemology of the sort which Bultmann 
in generaL In this regard, it will be helpful to dis-
following the work of Rudolf Carnap, between two 
questions of existence vis-a-vis world-views. 'Internal 
' are those questions which concern the existence of 
given the logical structure of a specified world-view. 
questions' are questions regarding the existenc~ of 
specified world-view in itself.3 Most non-meta-logical 
of truth and value (including the presuppositions of 
inquiry) are internal questions, which presuppose the 
structure of the relevant world-view. On a relativist 
•'YY'Ir>~nnru, the truth or falsity, and the logical or empirical 
or contradiction, of answers to these internal questions 
and value are relative to, and dependent on, the logical 
of the world-view in question. So within a relativist 
, internal absolutist claims are perfectly sensible and 
Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, 
· (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, I 97 I), p. r I 7. 
'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and Christianity, p. 71. 
Carnap, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', .in Seman_tics. and the 
of Language, ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, Ill.: Umv. of Illmo1s Press, 
20gf. 
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coherent in so far as they are regarded as 
within the world-view which they presuppose-. """"-''"UI;t=' 
But Bultmann's absolutist claims are not mad 
absolutist claims, and consequently his e 
contradictory. For the difficulty with Bultmann' 
claim.s about the Chdsti~n faith is that they · 8 
questwns, yet they are, ultimately, cast in unres:tri,cted 
terms. Thus, Bultmann treats certain absolutist 
the kerygma as logically prior to and as en<~on1r general, and otherwise consistent, relativity ofhis 
history. 
IV 
Bultmann's insistence on the inviolateness of the, 
tradition-so that the eschatological event to which it 
not 'implicated' in historical relativity-rests on 
absolutist claims. Bultmann holds that the 
kerygma, or of the Christian faith, is absolute. 
this claim is founded on as well as foundational for 
hermeneutical circle here) the further claim that 
ism's, and particularly Martin Heidegger's, und 
human existence is correct, absolutely. Bultmann 
to hold that 'to speak of faith in the living God 
presence in Christ is pure myth unless these things 
existentialist interpretation' .1 
In assessing the contradiction which these absol 
engender within Bultmann's thought, it should first 
that Bultn1ann's arguments for an Existentialist · 
of human existence, and therefore of the kerygma, 
circular. In Jesus Christ and Mythology, he argues: 
every interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, . 
suppositions of his exegesis, ... Man's life is TYli''\'UP•ri .· 
search for God because it is always moved, coJnsc:lQt 
unconsciously, by the question about his own 
existence ... the adequate way to put the qu .... .., ..... ·.. J.L.L ......... 
interpret the Bible ... is, how is man's existence 
the Bible? . . . Existentialist phiLosophy, ... -------·-, .-
existence my own personal responsibility, and 
1 
Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind\ in 
p. 105 (italics mine). cf. p. I ro. 
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to make me open to the word of the Bible. 
follows that existentialist philosophy can offer 
te conceptions for the interpretation of the Bible, 
the interpretation of the Bible is concerned with the 
10~1 :~L·~ ..... , ... •ng of existence.1 
formalise Bultmann's argument as follows: 
central human questions-e.g. the 
for God-in essence involve 
erstanding one's own existence. 
interpretation of any text 
, .. -.-~,, .. .,.., some presuppositions for the 
ouc;:;L . LU~L" addressed to the text. 
, in interpreting the Bible, 
must [at least] ask how human 
·\.i.l> ....... .,.v~~--- is understood there. 
E}iJSten:na.nsin makes the question of 
personal existence my respon-
y. 
, Existentialism helps the 
interpreter to be open to what the 
'ble says about human existence. 
Therefore, Existentialism offers 





from I and 2 
Definition 
Conclusion 
from 3 and 4 
Conclusion 
from 3 and 5 
ly, premise (I) is a critical premise here. It is necessary 
subordinate conclusion in line (3), and it is thereby 
both for the second subordinate conclusion, (5), and 
principal conclusion, (6), of the argument. But (I) is 
a statement of the Existentialist position (re-expressed 
. Thus, Bultmann commits the fallacy of petitio principii 
pposing this Existentialist position as part of his argument 
adequacy of that same Existentialist analysis for biblical 
is not surprising, however, since Bultmann himself 
that every interpretation necessarily involves some 
uppo:sitions, and thus necessarily involves some world-view. 
1 
Bultmann, Jesus Christ and .Mythology, pp. 48, 53, 56, and 57· 
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Regarding his own view of biblical exegesis, he says that 
I think I may take for granted that the right question 
frame with regard to the Bible-at any rate within 
Church-is the question of human existence. I am 
to that by the urge to inquire existentially about my 
existence.1 
But this is simply an expression of Bultmann's own world · 
The fact that Bultmann himself feels compelled to use 
Existentialist position in his biblical exegesis obviously does 
entail the necessity of using that philosophical position as 
every foundational world-view for any biblical exegesis. 
Turn now to this more damaging problem: Bultmann 
tradicts his own basic philosophy of history, and its 
epistemology, by arguing from the espousal and u~ .......... UJLv.:>.:~ 
himself of this Existentialist analysis, to the suggestion that 
world-view which does not use such an Existentialist 
can only produce a mythological interpretation of the 
The danger and inevitability of a mythological inrpy·n ..... .,t-..,+-.;~~·· 
the Bible if one uses a different world-view may appear 
from within Bultmann's own Existentialist world-view. Yet 
the same conclusion follow from the world-view of every 
biblical exegete? Empirically, this question must o · 
answered negatively. But the crucial issue here is a logical 
not an empirical one. Bultmann unqualifiedly accepts 
Existentialist analysis as a foundation for biblical exegesis, 
insists on the absolute truth of the ( demythologised) 
These positions are logically inconsistent with the 
epistemology which he employs in claiming that, in 
other matters of truth and value are governed by 
sentential operators. However laudable, Bultmann's 
insulate the kerygma against relativity is purely ad hoc on 
has proposed his relativistic epistemology in recognition. 
historical relativity. 
It is one thing for Bultmann to say that the purpose 
demythologising hermeneutic is to interpret, not elimina 
mythological elements of the Bible and so to make the 
faith clearer to modern people~2 Some 1nethodological 
1 Bultmann 'Bultmann Replies to f·Iis Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, PP· 
2 Bultmann; 'The Case for Demythologization', in 1\ifyth and Christianity, P~ 
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Sary for biblical exegesis, and this is just a statement neces . 
h neutical principle which Bultmann feels compelled frm~n the face of historical relativism. But it is an 
emp oy different matter for Bultmann to hold that 'our task 
er · · · · f h th duce an existentialist InterpretatiOn o t e ... my -pro '1 d h 
of the New Testament an t at 
e are concerned with is the 'right' philosophy. 
w The 'right' philosophy is simply one which has 
w~rked out an appropriate terminology for the under-
f . 2 standing 0 existence. 
has clearly ignored his own injunction against the 
,unHJ.a,ut.h.uat the New Testament expresses 'ti~e~ess general 
Furthermore, it is just this self-contradicting attempt 
k. absolutist claims about Existentialism, which leads rna e d' d b 
.... , .... _~..,.,..,..., to offer the futile circular argument, Iscusse a ove, 
the necessity of employing Existentialist conceptions for 
exegesis. . . . . 
'ng this difficulty with his absolutist claims about 
·"" .:_ ... ,.~.,_.,, · an analogous difficulty arises with Bultmann's 
':trt•Pntarlce or' the absolute demands of Christian faith. Bult-
concludes History and Eschatology by saying that: 
meaning in history lies always in the present, and when the 
present is conceived a~ th.e e~chato~ogica~ pr~sent by 
Christian faith the meanmg In history IS reahsed. 
as Bultmann himself declares in his Theology of the New 
about the historical inquiry involved in biblical 
theological investigator obviously cannot presuppose 
his own faith as an epistemological instrument and make 
of it as a presupposition for methodological work. 4 
J\- .......... u ......... beings are historical beings, subject to the forces of 
relativity. How could one be certain that the 
faith gives meaning to history for everyone? On 
.. -u,LUI..JLJ.J..a .. u.tJ.'s own relativist philosophy of history, one could not 
1 Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, p. 16. 
2 Bultmann, 'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, p. I 93· 
3 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. I55· 
'Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 2, p. 241. 
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know this absolutely; and indeed, this claim abo t th 
meaningfulness of Christian faith is simply on u . e 
Christian faith itself. e 
v 
T~is. cc:nflict which arises in Bultmann's thought 
relativist Impetus for demythologising and his own 
to Existentialist principles derives in part I 
Bultmann's conception of 'the modern scientific H'"'·' ....... 
a. relatively monolithic phenomenon. Bultmann 
dichotomy between 'the' mythological-ancient ur.-..... ,~. ~c 
'the' s~ier:tific-modern world-view. Starting from 
to~y: It Is easy to suppose that, if focusing on 
pnnCiples and the search for the meaning of human 
helps many modern people to understand the Bible 
will help all modern people since they all share th~ 
scientific world-view. However, recent 
philosophy of science indicate that it is not correct to 
scientific world-view. 
Thomas Kuhn has argued persuasively in The 
Scientific Revolutions that throughout history, 
advanced by means of successive changes in the 
'paradigms' of the community of scientists. Kuhn 
science does not consist of the slow accretion of facts 
but of radical and revolutionising shifts of 
Regarding such scientific revolutions, he says that: 
when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the 
perception of his environment must be re··ectucat<::CI 
some familiar situations he must learn to see a new 
After he has done so the world of his research 
here and there, incommensurable with the one 
inhabited before. . . . [This is a] reason why 
guided by paradigms are always at cross-purposes. 
Science has, then, evolved in such a manner that 
world-views are incompatible with earlier 
views. 2 Consequently, within the complexities of 
century, there is no single scier1tific world-view. 
is a set of incompatible worlq-views, some held by 
1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
Chicago Press, 1962), p. 1 I x. 2 See esp•eCll:tllY 
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older scientific world-views, and some held by scientists 
world-views are incompatible with other new 
world-views. And given the historical factors affecting 
scientific paradigms, science, like all human endeavors, 
on within the strictures of historical relativism: there 
scientific facts, simpliciter, but only the 'facts' given a 
scientific world-view. 
demythologising the Bible, whether in the 
or scientific sense, is not as simple a task as either 
.~ •• .,.+,,ncr language which does not talk about this world or 
explanations which do not correspond to the 
·scientific world-view. If the scientific community is so 
in its world-views, how much more are 'modern people' 
in their world-views. Moreover, as Kuhn points out, 
resisting a new scientific paradigm there is no 
which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific' .1 
of scientists hold a scientific world-view. Just so as ~ 
their world-views are internally consistent and coher~nt 
cannot, on the basis of his or her own modern world~ 
someone holding another, contrary modern world-
being inconsistent or incoherent. In sum, Bultmann 
more correctly claim that there is only one scientific 
· than he can claim that a modern person is illogical 
onsiiSt(~nt merely because he or she does not subscribe to 
xis1:entla.llst world-view-or does not find the meaning of 
in the Christian faith. 
VI 
's own attempt to reconcile his general relativist 
.....,,.,.,,.,.,..,,.. with his view of the absolutist demands of the 
fa~th f~ils. In J~sus Christ and Mythology he suggests 
histoncal relativity necessitates demythologisation of 
texts: 
itself demands to be freed from any world-view 
d by man's thought, whether mythological or 
For all human world-views objectivise the world 
,n-n,... •• .,. or eliminate the significance of the encounter 
personal existence. 2 
rs8. 
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 83. cf. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, 
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According to Bultmann, then, even while Christ· ~ . 
b 1 . . b' . . Ian 1atth a bs? ute, It his not su pect to relativism precisely because 
su ~ect to t e vaganes of any world-view. This · 
though, e~abl~ Christian faith to escape the gener:~ew 
Bu~tmann s philosophy ofhistory, because any possib_l,.e.._,..,"''"' 
wh~c~ a person may have to the kerygmatic 
delimited by that person's world-view. 
The significance of the kerygma for oneself depe d 
h 
. . n s 
on t e semantic mearungfulness of the proclamat1' 
· h ld on. wise, t ere wou be no content to respond to in the 
tion'. Bultmann recognises this, although he does not 
the full implications of that recognition, when he says 
If faith in the Word of God can only be the work f 
Holy Ghost operating through intelligent decisi~n 
follows that the understanding of the text is attainable ' 
ir: system~tic interpreta~ion, and the terminology 
directs this understanding can be acquired only 
profane reflection .... 1 
But further, the semantic meaningfulness of the 
for oneself depends on the conceptual structure of one's 
world-view. Therefore given Bultmann's 
the historical rel~tivi.ty of world-views, the possibility 
ceptance, or of reJeCtiOn, of the kerygmatic proclama 
depend on, and vary with, one's world-view. (And 
literally, for some people the proclamation will ha 
any further enrichment of their world-view-no sigonitic 
because it will be semantically meaningless.) 
So the Christian faith too is caught in the relativity 
historicity. It is futile for Bultmann to enjoin 'those 
the modern world-view [to] live'-with respect to 
faith-'as though they had none' .2 But then, how can 
cile the absolutist claims of the kerygma with 
relativity? 
VII 
'Objective, critical reflectiqn' will not, as Bultmann 
provide a set of objectively 'correct' hermeneutical 
1 Bultmann, 'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, 
2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 85. 
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exegesis.1 We have seen that Bultmann himself fails 
.......... ~·-h-e must fail-in presupposing his own Existentialist 
in his search for the 'correct' hermeneutical prin-
We must assume some world-view in biblical exegesis 
to be consistent, we must acknowledge the relativity of 
that world-view even as we confront the Christian 
tion. Thus in order to avoid self-contradiction, 
'sown general relativistic philosophy of history would 
him to hold concomitantly that (a) the philosophic 
'tions which one holds in one's biblical exegesis are 
to the same relativity which governs the assumption of 
world-view, and that (b) response to the Christian faith is 
delimited by one's world-view. Yet here biblical exegesis 
the Christian faith are no different from science or history, 
any other human e_n~eavor or ~aith: _we can never sever 
from the relativity of our histonCity. And, moreover, 
...... --~·~ ..... 's fundamental intentions are in fact compatible with 
more radical relativity of (a) and (b) which he denies but 
actually foHows from his own relativistic philosophy of 
holds that it is 'only by faith that God is en-
as Person', 2 that this faith-encounter comes 
the kerygmatic proclamation. For Christ, Bultmann 
, 'meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else'. 3 
first, that proclamation can only come to us in human 
, using human concepts with all their historical and 
relativity. And second, relativity will also condition 
s response to that proclamation. In short, the very possi-
ofresponse to the proclamation rests on internal questions 
rvo1v'mv one's own historically relativised world-view. Yet 
tible with the pastoral motivation for Bultmann's 
.emlvtllol,oglSinlg hermeneutiC-where the task is to discover how 
ew Testament can be meaningful, and the kerygma tic claims 
otnoellm~r.for modern people. And this is also compatible with 
insistence that 'it is only when there is no ... objective 
that faith acquires meaning and strength'. 4 
Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Ker_ygma and Myth, 
.tsu:ltm~tnn, 'New Testament and Mythology', in 
.tlultm<:mn. 'The Case for Demythologization', in 
and Myth, p. 41. 
and Christianity, p. 6g. 
Furthermore, within this more consistent 
Bultmann's relativistic epistemology, it will still be 
hold that the demythologised kerygmatic 
absolute. But it is only absolute in its demand for 
those who, within the strictures of their own world 
understand the demand and are able to respond. 
only sense in which 'wherever a revealed faith 
asserts, and must assert, the absoluteness of its 
More precisely, this relativising of the absoluteness of 
faith has the logical form: 
It is true (or valuable) ... on world-view W . .. 
demand to decision of the Christian faith is absolute. 
And this logical form provides a model for rec:on~ciliJ 
central relativist and absolutist elements ofBultmann's 
For, relative to the world-views of those who could 
consistent application of the strictures of this logical 
account both for the absolute claims of the kerygma 
relativist epistemology like Bultmann's which 
human relativity. The demands of the faith will 
accounted absolute. But as William] ames would have 
proclamation is absolute, but only absolute for those 
it is a 'live option'. 2 
Yet at the same time, to the extent that discourse 
within the logical (or linguistic) bounds of those ................ ~ .. 
which the demand to decision of the Christian faith is 
the relativising sentential operators of a relativist 
like Bultmann's need only function implicitly. The 
sentential operators of a relativist epistemology 
import from the comparison of one world-view with 
from the examination of a single idea from the point 
different world-views. Hence, whenever both the 
the hearers possess world-views on which respohs 
demand to decision of the Christian faith is possible, 
statements about the demand to decision will not 
relativist epistemology-as long as relativising 
operators implicitly govern t4ose statements. 
1 ibid., p. 67. 
2 See Section I of William James's essay, 'The Will to 
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the exigencies of historical relativism, Bultmann 
Preserve the meaning of the New Testament to · · · H 'fi 11 h tion by demythologising It. e speci ca y opes to 
b t reinterpret the mythology of the New Testament 
u that for modern people the meaning of the New 
mythology is its expression of human self-
~-·"'"",...· One may or may not be able to accept 
own Existentialist world-view or his view of which 
:tions of the New Testament are mythological for 
po a modern person. For the acceptability of philo-
as 'b'l' f h presuppositions, and the possi IIty o r~sponse to .t .e 
faith are relative to our own world-views. Yet 1t Is 
we d~ not have the same world-views as the world-
hich inform the biblical texts. 'It is only through the 
tion that the cross can become a personal encounter,'1 
If this is so, then indeed if there is to be any 
that the Christian faith will be meaningful for us, the 
:u.~. ................. ~~ must be demythologised-even as we recognise 
philosophical presuppositions ~?ic~ we employ in that 
conditioned by our own re]atiVIty. 
'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth, 
indebted to Gordon Kaufman. an~ Ge~rge MacRae, whose comments 
clarify several of the issues ra1sed m thrs paper. 
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